By Joseph Wu 吳釗燮
The
Sunflower movement’s sit-in at the legislature has come to a peaceful
end, but one of the most important issues prompting the protesters to
occupy the Legislative Yuan is yet to be addressed: Taiwan’s
constitutional system does not provide an adequate mechanism to deal
with political gridlock.
Since
former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) began the democratization process,
Taiwan has undergone seven rounds of constitutional revision. However,
these efforts did not produce a presidential or a parliamentary system,
but rather a mix of both. In the eyes of academics and political
scientists, the existing system lacks full operability.
Under
the Constitution, the president is directly elected and the
commander-in-chief has the power to appoint the premier, the power to
chair the National Security Council and can also be the chairman of his
or her party. With no effective mechanism to balance the position’s
influence, the president is supremely powerful.
The
Legislative Yuan, in contrast to the US Congress, lacks the powers
needed to provide proper checks-and-balances. In particular, the powers
of oversight, investigation and impeachment are in the hands of the
Control Yuan, whose members are appointed by the president.
Under
the Constitution, the premier is answerable to the Legislative Yuan,
which makes the relationship between it and the Executive Yuan similar
to a parliamentary system. The legislature can initiate a vote of
no-confidence in the premier and if it passes, the premier can request
that the president dissolve the legislature and call fresh elections.
This is also similar to a parliamentary mechanism for resolving
political gridlock.
However,
in practice, a vote of no-confidence has very little chance of success
because lawmakers do not want to initiate an election and the ruling
party is likely to block the attempt by applying party discipline. This
may prevent the premier from being toppled by the legislature, but it
also perpetuates gridlock.
Moreover,
under the Constitution, the premier cannot attach a vote of confidence
to a bill that the Executive Yuan deems crucial and the president or the
premier cannot dissolve the legislature and call for a fresh election
without a vote of no-confidence. Consequently, the methods of resolving
political difficulties in typical parliamentary systems are not
applicable.
In
addition, the public understands the importance of the legislature to
democracy, but surveys in the past decade clearly show public
disapproval and distrust of the Legislative Yuan. This could have been
predicted given the very small size of the legislature, which now has
113 seats. Also, 75 percent of the members are elected by constituents.
These members need to look after their constituencies so little time is
devoted to in-depth policy deliberation.
There
is a consensus in Taiwanese academia that the problem can only be
resolved by a reform of the electoral system. Many believe a German
system should be emulated, which would substantially increase the number
of seats, with overall seats distributed based on proportional
representation while half of the seats from single-member district
elections would be retained.
Without
major constitutional reform, it is likely that political gridlock will
reoccur. This will undoubtedly hamper Taiwan’s good governance, economic
development and democratic consolidation.
One major demand of the movement is for a national conference on the Constitution. As a political scientist by training and one who has worked within the system, I fully understand the problems associated with the Constitution and support reform into a presidential or parliamentary system. It is all about good governance and democratic consolidation, not sovereignty.
One major demand of the movement is for a national conference on the Constitution. As a political scientist by training and one who has worked within the system, I fully understand the problems associated with the Constitution and support reform into a presidential or parliamentary system. It is all about good governance and democratic consolidation, not sovereignty.
Political
scientists frequently define democratic consolidation as the political
rules of the game, ie, constitutional rules and norms, being accepted
with no or very little challenge. Taiwan is a young democracy and many
of its international partners support the nation based on the common
values and beliefs of democracy. However, it will become a grave problem
for Taiwan’s democratic consolidation if the constitutional rules of
the political game are seriously challenged from within the system or
from outside.
The
Sunflower movement has challenged the rules of the game in the name of
safeguarding democracy. The movement’s level of public support provides a
significant impetus to an overhaul of the Constitution.
Taiwan
wishes to stand tall among the community of democratic nations and
contribute to needed democratic development in the region. Hopefully,
its friends in the international community will voice their support for
efforts to reform, for this will be the path to deepen Taiwan’s budding
democracy.
This article was originally published in the Taipei Times on Monday, April 21, 2014.
